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Notes
Prohibiting Marital Status Discrimination: A
Proposal for the Protection of Unmarried
Couples
by JoHN C. BEATTIE*
The institution of marriage, for those who choose to enter it,
affords special legal and social advantages.' The United States Su-
preme Court recognizes a fundamental right to marry,2 and courts
carefully scrutinize state actions that may impinge on that right.'
Thus, married couples can be secure in the knowledge that the legal
system supports and encourages their relationships.
But what of unmarried couples? In the last ten years a growing
minority.has chosen to enter into intimate relationships, often mak-
ing homes together, sharing living expenses, and having children
without the legal bond of marriage. 4 Many lesbians and gay men,
* B.A. 1987, University of California, Berkeley; Member, Third Year Class. The
author would like to thank Matt Coles of the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern
California for his encouragement and constructive critique of this project.
1. One commentator notes:
[T]he marriage relationship confers upon its participants preferential tax treatment,
a right of action with regard to a fatal accident of the spouse, social security
benefits, and the protection of the law of intestate succession. Moreover, the
married couple benefits from innumerable nongovernmental benefits such as em-
ployee family health care, group insurance, lower automobile insurance, family
memberships in various organizations, and the ability to hold real estate by the
entirety.
Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United
States, 30 HAsTINGs L.J. 799, 874 (1979).
2. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942).
3. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (Virginia's statute preventing marriages between persons
based on racial classifications held to violate the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
and due process clauses).
4. "Between 1980 and 1988, the number of unmarried couple households increased by
63 [plus or minus 11.3] percent .... " BUREAU oF aH CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OP
COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, HOUSEHOLDS, FAMSIIES, MARITAL STATUS AND
LiviNG ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1988 (ADvANcE REPORT), SERIES P-20, -No. 432, at 1 (Sept.
1988) [hereinafter CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: MARITAL STATUS].
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who cannot legally marry their partners in any state,5 also are in-
volved in long-term, intimate relationships. What rights, if any, do
these unmarried couples have by virtue of their choice to make a
family together?6 Statutory and case law recognizing and protecting
unmarried couples is sparse but growing. 7 Because the Constitution
and federal statutes offer little protection,' unmarried couples pri-
marily have asserted their rights in state courts.
This Note discusses the role that state prohibitions against mar-
ital status discrimination have played in protecting the rights of un-
married couples. It argues that, by prohibiting marital status
discrimination in employment, housing, public accommodations, and
credit, state legislators intended to forbid certain businesses from
differentiating among individuals on the basis of their choice to be
married or unmarried. Furthermore, this Note argues, because some
commonly accepted practices disadvantage unmarried couples, in-
cluding lesbians and gay men, these practices should fall within the
proscription against marital status discrimination.
Part I surveys marital status discrimination cases, pointing out
the two prevalent interpretations of marital status discrimination
adopted by state courts. This Part also considers theoretical problems
implicit in the courts' application of a "marital status discrimina-
tion" test. Part II argues that using a rule in marital status discrim-
ination cases that consideres the identity or position of one's partner
is consistent with the legislative purpose of most states' antidiscri-
mination laws. To resolve the theoretical problems left unanswered
by most judicial opinions, Part II also formulates a refined test for
determining when marital status discrimination has occurred.
Finally, Part III discusses some innovative ways courts apply
marital status discrimination provisions and suggests other protec-
5. See Rivera, supra note 1, at 874-78. See generally SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE
LAW (R. Achtenberg ed. 1990).
6. The word family is used in this Note to describe any relationship between two or
more individuals of either sex who function as a supportive and nurturing unit, regardless
of whether the family "figureheads" are married.
7. Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co., 605 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (requiring
creditors to treat an unmarried couple applying for joint credit the same as a married
couple); Atkisson v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 59 Cal. App. 3d 89, 130 Cal. Rptr. 375
(1976) (holding that an unmarried mother could not be prohibited from living with her
boyfriend in public housing); Whitman v. Mercy-Memorial Hosp., 128 Mich. App. 155, 339
N.W.2d 730 (1983) (holding that a hospital may not bar an unmarried father from the
delivery room); Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d
784 (1989) (holding that the unmarried partner of a deceased tenant may remain in an
apartment as a member of the deceased's family).
8. For a discussion of possible constitutional protection for unmarried couples, see
Boyle, Marital Status Classifications: Protecting Homosexual and Heterosexual Cohabitors,
14 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 111 (1986).
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tions such provisions might offer to unmarried couples. Specifically,
this Part suggests that prohibitions against marital status discrimi-
nation can provide protection for lesbians and gay men in some of
their familial choices.
I. The History of Marital Status Discrimination Law
Beginning in the mid to late 1970s, many states enacted or
amended civil rights laws to include prohibitions against marital status
discrimination. 9 Protections against such discrimination vary by ju-
risdiction. For instance, states have outlawed marital status discrim-
ination in housing, 0 employment," public accommodations, 12 and
credit transactions. 3 In 1974, Congress enacted the Federal Equal
9. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 note (West 1976) (employment discrimination
measure amended to include marital status by 1970 N.J. Laws ch. 80, § 14); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 49.60.180 note (1990) (employment discrimination measure amended to include
marital status by 1973 Wash. Laws ch. 141, § 10); 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1195, § 1; 1975 N.Y.
Laws ch. 803, § 1.
10. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240 (1986); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12955 (West 1980);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-502 (1990); CON. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64 (West 1986); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4603 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2515 (1987); FiA. STAT. ANN. §
420.605(5)(i)(1) (West Supp. 1990); HAw. REv. STAT. § 515-3 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
68, para. 3-102 (Smith-Hurd 1989 & Supp. 1990); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 20 (1979);
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 37.2502 (West 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 subdiv. 2
(West Supp 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-9.1 (West 1976); N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 296(2-a)
(McKinney 1982); OR. REv. STAT. § 659.033 (1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37-4 (Supp. 1990);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.222 (1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101.22 (West 1988 & Supp.
1990).
11. See, e.g., ALAsIA STAT. § 18.80.220 (1986); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(a) (West
1980); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60 (West 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (1979);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.10(2) (West 1986); HAw. REv.
STAT. § 378-2 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para. 2-102 (Smith-Hurd 1989); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 49B, § 16 (1979); MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 37.2202(1) (West 1985); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 363.03 subdiv. I (West Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-303 (1989);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1104 (1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8 I.-Ill. (1984); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 1976); N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 296(1) (McKinney 1982); OR. REv.
STAT. § 659.030 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.180 (1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
111.321-.322 (West 1988); see also [8A Fair Empl. Prac. Man.] Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA)
451:102-04 (1991) (charts explaining what types of discrimination are prohibited in the
states).
12. See, e.g, Ax.AsK STAT. § 18.80.230 (1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (1990);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64 (West 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4504 (1979); HAW.
REv. STAT. § 368-1 (1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4552 (1989); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 49B, § 5(a) (1979); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 37.2302 (West 1985); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 354-A:8(IV) (1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(f) (West 1976); N.Y. ExEC. LAw §
296(2) (McKinney 1982); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.680 (1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 9, § 4502
(1984).
13. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.250 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-87-104 (1987);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-1-109 (1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-66 (West 1986); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 725.07 (West 1988); HAw. REV. STAT. § 477E-3 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
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Credit Opportunity Act,14 which prohibits discrimination on the basis
of marital status in all credit transactions. 5 Most of these legislative
enactments, however, fail to define the term "marital status" or to
provide guidance as to what constitutes marital status discrimina-
tion. 16 Therefore, it has been left up to the courts in each jurisdiction
to define this term and decide when it applies.
To define marital status discrimination courts first examine the
words of the applicable statute.' 7 A typical state statute prohibiting
marital status discrimination in employment provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice, unless based upon a
bona fide occupational qualification, ...
... [flor an employer, because of the race, religious creed,
color, national origin, ancestry, physical handicap, medical con-
dition, marital status, or sex of any person, to refuse to hire or
employ the person or to refuse to select the person for a training
program leading to employment, or to bar or to discharge the per-
son from employment or from a training program leading to em-
ployment, or to discriminate against the person in compensation or
in terms, conditions or privileges of employment. 18
68, para. 4-102 (Smith-Hurd 1989); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.10 (West 1988); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:3583 (West 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4596 (1989); MD. COM.
LAW CODE ANN. § 12-603 (1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.147a (West Supp. 1990);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 subdiv. 2(3), 8 (West Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 314.100
(Vernon Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-306 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
598B.100 (Michie 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 1976); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296-a
(McKinney 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-180(d) (1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.021
(Anderson 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 1-109 (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-
37-4.3 (1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-802 (1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 1211 (1984);
VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-21.21:1 (1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.176 (1990); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 138.20 (West 1989); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 64(8)(e)(i) (1982).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1988).
15. Id. at § 1691(a)(1); see also Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co., 605 F.2d
566, 569-70 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (requiring creditors to treat an unmarried couple applying for
joint credit the same as a married couple).
16. A few states have defined the term "marital status" statutorily. See, e.g., CAL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, § 7292.1 (1990) ("An individual's state of marriage, non-marriage,
divorce or dissolution, separation, widowhood, annulment, or other marital state."); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-2502(17) (1987) ("the state of being married, single, divorced, separated, or
widowed and the usual conditions associated therewith, including pregnancy and parent-
hood."); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para. 1-103(J) (Smith-Hurd 1989) ("the legal status of
being married, single, separated, divorced or widowed."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01(24)
(West Supp. 1991) ("whether a person is single, married, remarried, divorced, separated, or
a surviving spouse and, in employment cases, includes protection against discrimination on
the basis of the identity, situation, actions, or beliefs of a spouse or former spouse."); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 111.32(12) (West 1988) ("the status of being married, single, divorced,
separated or widowed.").
17. See, e.g., Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal
Bd., 51 N.Y.2d 506, 509, 415 N.E.2d 950, 951, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961, 962 (1980); Washington
Water Power Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 91 Wash. 2d 62, 586 P.2d
1149 (1978).
18. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(a) (West Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
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Courts often invoke common law rules of interpretation to de-
termine the meaning of the term "marital status." 19 Under the "com-
mon intelligence test," 20 one court held that people of normal
intelligence "commonly relate the term 'marital status' to the ex-
istence or absence of a marital bond.' '21 Another jurisdiction, using
the same test, defined marital status as "the social condition enjoyed
by an individual by reason of his or her having participated or failed
to participate in a marriage." 22 In applying these definitions, how-
ever, the courts have reached vastly different conclusions about what
constitutes unlawful marital status discrimination. Some courts have
adopted a narrow view of marital status discrimination, holding that
discrimination occurs only when an individual is treated differently
solely because of her individual marital status.23 Other courts, adopt-
ing a broader view, find illegal discrimination when marital status
is among the determining factors in the challenged decisionmaking. 24
The following sections explain these two prevailing theories of mar-
ital status discrimination and set forth the most common scenarios
in which courts address the issue. They also point out some unre-
solved theoretical problems inherent in the established tests for mar-
ital status discrimination.
A. The "Narrow View" of Marital Status Discrimination: The All-or-
None Rule
Under the "narrow view" of marital status discrimination, courts
find unlawful marital status discrimination only when a person is
treated differently on the sole basis of her status as single, married,
divorced, separated, or widowed.75 These courts, therefore, will strike
19. See e.g., Manhattan Pizza Hut, 51 N.Y.2d at 511, 415 N.E.2d at 953, 434 N.Y.S.2d
at 964; Loveland v. Leslie, 21 Wash. App. 84, 86, 583 P.2d 664, 666 (1978).
20. Under this test, a court either determines how a person of normal intelligence would
understand the statutory provision in question, Loveland, 21 Wash. App. at 87, 583 P.2d
at 666, or relies on the "fundamental rule of construction that words of common usage are
to be given their ordinary meaning," Manhattan Pizza Hut, 51 N.Y.2d at 511, 415 N.E.2d
at 953, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 964.
21. Loveland, 21 Wash. App. at 87, 583 P.2d at 666. In Loveland, the court found
that the statutory prohibition against marital status discrimination in housing was not
unconstitutionally vague because the statute provided fair notice of the prohibited discrim-
ination. Id. at 86, 583 P.2d at 666.
22. Manhattan Pizza Hut, 51 N.Y.2d at 511, 415 N.E.2d at 953, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 964.
23. See infra Part I.A.
24. See infra Part I.B.
25. Manhattan Pizza Hut, 51 N.Y.2d at 512, 415 N.E.2d at 953, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 964;
see also Miller v. C.A. Muer Corp., 420 Mich. 355, 364, 362 N.W.2d 650, 655 (1984)
(antinepotism policies do not amount to discrimination on the basis of marital status because
their focus is on the relationship between the employees, not on the marital status of an
July 1991]
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down a policy based on marital status only if the policy uniformly
disadvantages every individual within a particular marital status clas-
sification.
The New York Court of Appeals first promulgated this rule in
Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal
Board.26 Pizza Hut presents a typical example of marital status dis-
crimination in the employment context. 27 The case involved a married
couple who had been employed at the same restaurant for four years.
Invoking a corporate policy prohibiting spouses from working to-
gether, an area manager fired the wife. 21 She filed a complaint with
the State Human Rights Division, 29 which found that her termination
employee); Thomson v. Sanborn's Motor Express, Inc., 154 N.J. Super. 555, 561, 382 A.2d
53, 56 (1977) (employer's policy against relatives working in the same department did not
amount to marital status discrimination).
26. 51 N.Y.2d 506, 415 N.E.2d 950, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1980).
27. Almost all of the states that have interpreted prohibitions against marital status
discrimination in employment have done so in the context of a challenge to an antinepotism
policy. See, e.g., infra notes 28-38 and 48-54.
28. The policy stated:
I. Employee[s] are not permitted to work in a position where their supervisor or
their supervisor's supervisor is a relative. II. The term 'relative' shall apply, but
not be limited to, the following relationships, whether established by blood,
marriage, or other legal actions: Father, Mother, Brother, Sister, Husband, Wife,
Son, Daughter, Grandfather, Grandmother, Grandson, Granddaughter. III. Where
such situations exist through promotion, transfer or marriage, action will be taken
to transfer or to terminate one of the employees within a two (2) month period
after the relationship is determined or established. No capable and conscientious
employee should be terminated if transfer is possible.
Manhattan Pizza Hut, 51 N.Y.2d at 509 n.2, 415 N.E.2d at 952 n.2, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 962-
63 n.2.
This factual scenario also exemplifies the recurring problem of women bearing the brunt
of antinepotism policies. No-spouse policies typically exclude the second applicant-spouse.
Because women historically have entered the labor market after men, these policies have
penalized women more than men. See Wexler, Husbands and Wives: The Uneasy Case for
Antinepotism Rules, 62 B.U.L. REv. 75, 79 (1982); see also Kleiman, Anti-Nepotism Rules
Losing Grip on the Workplace, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 22, 1988, at C6, col. 4.
For example, in Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 562 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1977), two
female plaintiffs challenged an employer's no-spouse policy as sex discrimination under Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The plaintiffs showed that seventy-one women were denied
employment under the policy, compared to three men during the same time period. Id. at
497. The court found that the plaintiffs established a prima facie case of sex discrimination
under the statute, id. at 498, but held that the employer had adequate justification for
refusing to hire spouses of current employees. Id. at 499-500. But see Wexler, supra, at 78
(criticizing employer justifications for prophylactic antinepotism policies).
29. In many cases enforcement of the civil rights law is delegated to state or local
human rights commissions, who have the administrative power to issue complaints and
adjudicate disputes. These agencies are given the primary responsibility to interpret and
apply antidiscrimination law. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12930-35 (West 1980) (empow-
ering a Fair Employment and Housing Commission to enforce California's antidiscrimination
laws); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 293-95 (McKinney 1982) (empowering a Human Rights Division
1420 [Vol. 42
violated the state's prohibition against marital status discrimination
in employment and ordered her reinstated with back pay. 30 The court
of appeals reversed, however, finding that no illegal discrimination
had occurred.3 1
Relying on common usage of the term "marital status," the Pizza
Hut court found that "when one is queried about one's 'marital
status', the usual and complete answer would be expected to be a
choice among 'married', 'single', etc., but would not be expected to
include an identification of one's present or former spouse and cer-
tainly not the spouse's occupation. ' 32 The court used this construc-
tion of the term "marital status" to conclude that the legislature only
meant to proscribe actions based solely on the applicant's individual
marital status.3 3 Since Pizza Hut's decision to terminate the plaintiff
was based on a factor not included in the court's definition of "mar-
ital status," the court reasoned that marital status was not the sole
reason for the termination and thus no prohibited discrimination had
occurred.
In justifying its interpretation of the statute, the Pizza Hut court
discussed the benefits of antinepotism rules, citing both actual and
perceived problems arising when closely related individuals work to-
gether. Because it recognized these problems as strong justifications
for prohibiting spouses from working together,34 the court concluded
that the legislature did not intend to prohibit such policies. 35 The
court opined that:
[E]mployers may no longer decide whether to hire, fire, or promote
someone because he or she is single, married, divorced, separated
or the like. Had the Legislature desired to enlarge the scope of its
proscription to prohibit discrimination based on an individual's
marital relationships-rather than simply on an individual's marital
status-surely it would have said so. 36
Other courts have followed a similar rationale when reconciling pro-
hibitions against marital status discrimination and antinepotism pol-
to enforce New York's antidiscrimination laws); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 49.60.050-120
(West 1990) (empowering a Human Rights Commission to enforce Washington's antidiscri-
mination laws).
30. Manhattan Pizza Hut, 51 N.Y.2d at 510, 415 N.E.2d at 952, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 963.
31. Id. at 514, 415 N.E.2d at 954, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 965.
32. Id. at 511-12, 415 N.E.2d at 953, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 964.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 513-14, 415 N.E.2d at 954, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 964-65. But see Wexler, supra
note 27, at 132-39 (criticizing courts for not examining more closely the justifications
proffered in support of antinepotism and no-spouse rules).
35. Manhattan Pizza Hut, 51 N.Y.2d at 513-14, 415 N.E.2d at 954, 434 N.Y.S.2d at
964-65.
36. Id. at 512, 415 N.E.2d at 953, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 964.
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icies. 37 One court distinguished antinepotism policies by finding that
prohibitions against marital status discrimination were "not designed
to prohibit employment discrimination based upon specific family
relationships, albeit the relationship . . . exists by reason of. .. mar-
riage."3s
The "narrow view" approach emphasizes that discrimination
occurs only when marital status is the sole basis for the adverse em-
ployment decision. In the context of the antinepotism policy, it is
clear that marital status is not the sole reason for the decision be-
cause, if it were, every married applicant would be affected. Instead,
an antinepotism policy only disadvantages a subclass of married ap-
plicants: those who have spouses already working for the employer.
Implicit in this "narrow view" approach, therefore, is the notion that
if the challenged policy does not disadvantage all married people,
none may invoke the state prohibition against marital status dis-
crimination to challenge it.
This narrow "all-or-none" rule of marital status discrimination
also is applied by the same jurisdictions in challenges to housing pol-
icies. Allegations of marital status discrimination in housing most
often arise when an unmarried couple is refused housing that is avail-
able to married couples.3 9 For example, in Prince George's County
v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc.,40 an unmarried couple applied for ad-
mission to a cooperative housing development but was refused be-
cause they were not married. 41
The plaintiffs in Prince George's County argued that since they
would not have been denied admission if they were married, the
cooperative's policy discriminated against them on the basis of their
marital status.42 The state court, however, found that
neither complainant (each of whom was 'single,' 'unmarried') was
denied membership individually because of his or her individual
marital status. While each separately had a marital status, collec-
tively they did not. Only marriage as prescribed by law can change
the marital status of an individual to a new legal entity of husband
and wife. The law of Maryland does not recognize common law
marriages, or other unions of two or more persons-such as con-
37. See, e.g., Thomson v. Sanborn's Motor Express, Inc., 154 N.J. Super. 555, 382
A.2d 53 (1977).
38. Id. at 561, 382 A.2d at 56.
39. See, e.g., Atkisson v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 59 Cal. App. 3d 89, 93, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 375, 377 (1976); Evangelista Assoc. v. Bland, 117 Misc. 2d 558, 558-59, 458 N.Y.S.2d
996, 999 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1983); McFadden v. Elma Country Club, 26 Wash. App. 195, 197-
99, 613 P.2d 146, 148-49 (1980).
40. 49 Md. App. 314, 431 A.2d 745 (1981).
41. Id. at 315, 431 A.2d at 746.
42. Id. at 316, 431 A.2d at 746.
1422 [Vol. 42
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cubinage, syneisaktism, relationships of homosexuals or lesbians-
as legally bestowing upon two people a legally cognizable marital
status. Such relationships are simple illegitimate unions unrecog-
nized, or in some instances condemned, by the law.43
Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals refused to hold that
a lease restriction, permitting only members of a tenant's immediate
family to live in a leased unit, discriminated on the basis of marital
status.44 The court found that under the lease agreement the tenant's
boyfriend could not live in the apartment. The plaintiff argued that
the housing policy acted to her detriment because of her marital status.
The court rejected the plaintiff's argument and concluded, "Whether
or not [the plaintiff's boyfriend] could by marriage or otherwise be-
come a part of her immediate family is not at issue."145 Instead, the
court focused on the landlord's right to place restrictions on the
plaintiff's tenancy and suggested that since the plaintiff could be pro-
hibited from living with a legally unrelated female roommate, the
rule should be the same for a legally unrelated male roommate. 46
When applying the all-or-none rule of marital status discrimi-
nation to housing cases, the courts do not consider the unmarried
couple a family unit carrying its own marital status. Were the courts
to acknowledge the unmarried couple as such a unit, they would have
to conclude that "married-only" housing violates the prohibition of
marital status discrimination because it disadvantages all couples
having a particular marital status. Instead, these courts limit their
analysis by considering only whether each unmarried plaintiff is dis-
criminated against as compared to a married couple. 47 In this com-
mon factual situation courts find that the challenged housing policies
discriminate against an unmarried individual who wishes to live with
a nonspousal partner, not against a person solely because she is sin-
gle. Here, courts using the all-or-none rule find that the unmarried
plaintiffs have no protection because the challenged policies do not
affect all unmarried applicants, only those who choose to live with
an intimate partner outside the bounds of marriage.
In sum, under the all-or-none rule, challenges to housing and
employment policies fail when the disputed policy considers the
plaintiff's marital status in conjunction with some other factor, such
43. Id. at 319-20, 431 A.2d at 747-48 (citation omitted).
44. Hudson View Properties v. Weiss, 59 N.Y.2d 733, 735, 450 N.E.2d 234, 235, 463
N.Y.S.2d 428, 429 (1983).
45. Id. at 735, 450 N.E.2d at 235, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 429.
46. Id.
47. The court's unwillingness to compare married and unmarried couples, however,
should not necessitate a narrow interpretation of marital status discrimination. Rather, the
court could have focused on the fact that each applicant individually was subjected to a
different set of limitations .depending on his or her marital status.
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as whether the plaintiff's spouse works at the same job, or whether
the plaintiff and her unmarried partner will live together. Moreover,
courts adopting the all-or-none rule refuse to compare similarly sit-
uated married and unmarried couples and instead focus only on the
individual unmarried plaintiff. Under this interpretation, the pro-
hibition against marital status discrimination provides protection in
only one circumstance: an individual denied housing or employment
for no other reason than the fact that the individual is married (or
unmarried). On the other hand, any policy that attaches additional
considerations to the marital status classification will affect only a
portion of the protected class and thereby escape the legal prohi-
bition.
B. The "Broad View" of Marital Status Discrimination: The Inclusive
Rule
Unlike the narrow all-or-none rule discussed above, courts
adopting a broader view of marital status discrimination hold that
the identity or position of one's partner may be considered when
deciding if a policy is unlawfully discriminatory. The rule under this
interpretation is inclusive; it protects plaintiffs from policies that use
marital status classifications, even when those policies affect only a
portion of the protected class. In Thompson v. Board of Trustees,48
the plaintiff challenged a newly approved school board policy "[tihat
all school administrators of the Harlem Public Schools shall not have
a spouse employed in any capacity in the Harlem school system." ' 49
Because the plaintiff was married to another employee of the school
system at the time the policy came into effect, he was fired. 0 The
court held that the policy violated the state's marital status discrim-
ination laws. It reasoned that Montana's antidiscrimination laws "are
strongly worded directives from the legislature prohibiting employ-
ment discrimination and encouraging public employers to hire, pro-
mote and dismiss employees solely on merit."'" Comparing the
position of the married couple to a similarly situated unmarried cou-
ple, the court concluded that "a narrow interpretation of the term
'marital status' is unreasonable, and could lead to an absurd result
... if [the] plaintiff and his wife were simply to dissolve their mar-
48. 192 Mont. 266, 627 P.2d 1229 (1981).
49. Id. at 268, 627 P.2d at 1230.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 270, 627 P.2d at 1231.
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riage, both could keep their jobs. But for the fact this plaintiff is
married, he would still be working." ' 52
One court has suggested that antinepotism policies may impinge
on state and federal constitutional protections. In Kraft, Inc. v.
State, 5 a Minnesota court found that antinepotism policies are not
permitted under the state's prohibition against marital status dis-
crimination because they discriminate against married couples, who
enjoy special constitutional and state protection. The court found
that antinepotism policies impermissibly interfere with the right to
marry and reasoned that the legislature must have meant to include
such interference within its prohibition against marital status dis-
crimination. The court concluded, furthermore, that condoning such
a policy would "ignore the broad prohibition against arbitrary clas-
sifications embodied in the Human Rights Act and would elevate
form over substance. '5 4
In those courts adopting this broad, inclusive rule, a finding of
illegal marital status discrimination is not limited to employment pol-
icies that affect all members of a marital status class. An antine-
potism policy is impermissible because it uses an explicit marital status
classification, treating some individuals differently from others on
the basis of their decision to marry or refrain from marrying their
partners.
The inclusive rule of marital status discrimination, as applied to
housing policies, has been explained in Atkisson v. Kern Housing
Authority." In Atkisson, a divorced mother with six children chal-
lenged a local public housing policy prohibiting her boyfriend from
living with her. The court held that the policy, which prohibited low
income housing tenants from living with anyone of the opposite sex
not related to the tenant by blood, marriage, or adoption, illegally
discriminated on the basis of marital status. The court found that
the policy "automatically exclude[d] all unmarried cohabiting adults;
a class of persons defined by their marital status.'"56 Similarly, in
52. Id.
53. 284 N. W.2d 386 (Minn. 1979).
54. Id. at 388; see also Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights
Appeal Bd., 51 N.Y.2d 506, 514, 415 N.E.2d 950, 954, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961, 965 (1980)
(Cooke, C.J., dissenting) (antinepotism statute is discriminatory in that is applies to marital
partners but not to persons who are otherwise intimately related or living together).
55. 59 Cal. App. 3d 89, 130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976); see also, Hess v. Fair Employment
and Hous. Comm'n, 138 Cal. App. 3d 232, 187 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1982) (holding that the
owners of a rental duplex had unlawfully discriminated on the basis of marital status against
an unmarried couple seeking to rent the duplex).
56. Atkisson, 59 Cal. App. 3d at 96, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 379 (emphasis added).
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Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Service Co.,57 a federal court struck
down a mortgage company's policy of refusing to aggregate the in-
comes of unmarried couples applying for a joint mortgage while per-
mitting income aggregation for married couples.5 8 The court concluded
that the company's policy impermissibly treated couples differently
solely on the basis of their marital status.5 9 Courts adopting the in-
clusive rule analyze the challenged policy to determine whether the
same decision would have been made if the plaintiffs had a different
marital status. Significantly, these courts are willing to compare the
positions of married and unmarried couples to determine whether
marital status discrimination has occurred. As a result, in some si-
tuations, the plaintiff's choice of a specific partner, whether or not
a spouse, is protected by the prohibition against marital status dis-
crimination.
Some courts, however, limit the application of the inclusive rule.
For instance, in Cybyske v. Independent School District No. 196, 6
a teacher was terminated because the local school board disliked her
husband's political views. The court reasoned that the termination
of the plaintiff was not prohibited because the employer did not in-
voke an invidious classification to accomplish its goal. 61 Instead, the
court reasoned, the school board's decision represented its displeas-
ure with the husband's "political posture," a kind of discrimination
the legislature did not intend to proscribe. 62 In Cybyske, therefore,
the Minnesota court took a step back from the established inclusive
rule analysis. Instead of focusing on whether marital status played
a significant role in the employer's decision, the court drew an ar-
bitrary line, holding that employment discrimination on the basis of
a spouse's political posture is not proscribed by the prohibition against
marital status discrimination.6 1
57. 605 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Although this case was decided under the Federal
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1988), the court's rationale is illustrative
of how some state courts have interpreted the prohibition against marital status discrimi-
nation. See, e.g., Atkisson, 59 Cal. App. 3d 89, 130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976) (using Markham
as support for the conclusion that an unmarried mother could not be prohibited from living
with her boyfriend in public housing).
58. Markham 605 F.2d at 569-70.
59. Id. at 570.
60. 347 N.W.2d 256 (Minn.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 933 (1984).
61. Id. at 261.
62. Id.
63. For a critique of the Cybyske decision, see Note, Employment Discrimination Based
on Marital Status-Cybyske v. Independent School Dist. No. 196, 11 WM. MITCHELL L.
RaV. 277 (1985).
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In McFadden v. Elma Country Club,64 a Washington court re-
fused to apply the inclusive rule of marital status discrimination in
the housing context, creating an inconsistency within the jurisdiction
because the inclusive rule had been applied in the employment con-
text. In McFadden, an unmarried couple applied for admission to
a private housing development. The couple's application was denied
because they were not married. 65 The Washington court found that
the state's marital status discrimination statute66 did not protect the
couple because another Washington statute67 prohibited unmarried
couples from cohabiting.68 The court reasoned that the legislature did
not intend to protect unmarried couples in housing because unmar-
ried cohabitation was illegal at the time the antidiscrimination law
was enacted.6 9 The court concluded that there was no public policy
supporting the protection of cohabiting adults and, therefore, re-
fused to construe the antidiscrimination law so as to protect un-
married cohabitation. 70
Unlike the all-or-none rule of marital status discrimination, the
inclusive rule does not limit a court's inquiry to the question whether
every member of a marital status class would be affected equally by
the challenged policy. Instead, courts applying the inclusive rule find
that the prohibition of marital status discrimination includes any pol-
icy that uses a marital status classification as a determining factor.
To effectuate this analysis, many courts that use the inclusive rule
compare similarly situated married and unmarried couples. 7' If the
comparison shows disparate treatment based on a marital status clas-
sification, the marital status discrimination law is violated. These
courts, however, also have suggested that in some cases they may
refuse to apply the inclusive rule analysis if they believe that ap-
plication would lead to a result unintended by the legislature.
The following section points out some theoretical problems in-
herent in the inclusive and all-or-none rules of marital status dis-
64. 26 Wash. App. 195, 613 P.2d 146 (1980).
65. Id. at 197-98, 613 P.2d at 148.
66. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.222 (1990).
67. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.79.120 (repealed 1976).
68. McFadden, 26 Wash. App. at 202, 613 P.2d at 150 (citing WAH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.79.120 (repealed 1976)).
69. Id.
70. Id., 613 P.2d at 151. But see Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 779
P.2d 1199, 1202 (Alaska 1989) (holding that despite the existence of a law prohibiting
unmarried cohabitation, Alaska's marital status discrimination law protected unmarried
couples seeking to live together).
71. See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
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crimination-problems that courts have neither addressed fully nor
attempted to resolve.
C. The Problems Presented by Current Definitions and Applications of
Marital Status Discrimination
As the above cases show, defining and applying a test for marital
status discrimination has led different jurisdictions to reach sub-
stantially different conclusions about who is protected by antidis-
crimination laws. Both the courts that use the inclusive rule and those
that use the all-or-none rule base their analysis on legislative intent.
Significantly, however, not one marital status discrimination case has
cited the legislative history and debate surrounding the addition of
the term "marital status" to existing antidiscrimination statutes. 72 In
fact, such documented history appears to be largely unavailable. Thus,
the courts' only guide in discerning the legislative purpose behind the
prohibition of marital status discrimination is the language of the
statute itself.
The question of legislative intent is complicated by the fact that
prohibitions against marital status discrimination have created a pro-
tected class that is manifestly different from the other classes covered
by the same antidiscrimination statutes.
Unlike sex, race, or disability, for instance, a person can change
her marital status with relative ease. 73 It is not uncommon for some
individuals to be single, then marry, later divorce, and then marry
again. Therefore, a p rson's marital status may change several times,
whereas for most people race, sex, and disability are immutable char-
acteristics .74
Moreover, the ability to choose and change one's marital status
is complicated by the state's interest in marriage. Such an interest
72. In Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York Itate Human Rights Appeal Bd., 51
N.Y.2d 506, 511-12, 415 N.E.2d 950, 953, 434 N.Y.S.2J 9ol, 964 (1980), the court examined
a "legislative attachment" to N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1982), and concluded the
"attachment" supported adherence to an all-or-none rule. This "attachment," however,
merely defined "marital status"; it did not state that the law should apply only when marital
status is the "sole" basis for a discriminatory action.
73. This statement is less true for homosexual people who may not marry their partner
in any state. See Rivera, supra note 1, at 874-78; see also SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE
LAW, supra note 5. A gay person, however, may choose to enter into a heterosexual
marriage, thus changing her marital status.
74. Religion is another mutable characteristic protected under most antidiscrimination
laws. See 8A Fair Empl. Prac. Cas., supra note 11. Only a small minority of individuals,
however, are likely to change their religion as often or as easily as individuals change their
marital status.
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suggests that being married is considered the most desirable marital
status. 75 To confirm this suggestion, the state has granted married
individuals certain legal rights unavailable to single people.7 6 Thus,
on the one hand, state legislatures have decided that certain business
entities should make no distinction between individuals based on their
marital status; yet, on the other hand, these same legislatures have
granted married individuals significant preferential treatment.
(1) The Apparent Conflict Between the Prohibition of Marital Status
Discrimination and the State's Interest in Marriage
The apparent conflict between the public policy of nondiscrim-
ination and the state's interest in promoting marriage has led to in-
consistent results in employment and housing cases in which the
plaintiffs invoked the prohibition of marital status discrimination.
For example, courts that apply the all-or-none rule sometimes rely
on the state's interest in promoting marriage when they deny un-
married couples access to housing that is available to married cou-
ples. 77 Those courts suggest that granting relief to unmarried couples
would be tantamount to ignoring the special status granted to marital
unions .78
In employment cases, however, courts applying the same rule are
willing to uphold antinepotism policies that clearly disadvantage mar-
ried couples when compared to their unmarried counterparts. 79 For
instance, a couple involved in a serious relationship and engaged to
be married is not prohibited from working together under most an-
tinepotism policies (even if one fianc6 supervises the other).8 0 The day
75. See, e.g., Prince George's County v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 49 Md. App. 314, 431
A.2d 745 (1981). The fact that the state prefers the status of marriage further distinguishes
classes defined by their marital status from classes defined by their race or sex. Few would
question that the state is prohibited constitutionally from creating laws or policies which
expressly advantage one race or sex over another, outside of the limited exception for
affirmative action programs.
76. See Rivera, supra note 1, at 874 (discussing marital benefits such as preferential
tax treatment, wrongful death standing, social security benefits, intestate succession, and
other nongovernmental benefits).
77. See infra text accompanying notes 40-43.
78. Prince George's County, 49 Md. App. at 319-20, 431 A.2d at 748. Taken to its
extreme, the reasoning in Prince George's County could support the conclusion that Mar-
yland's prohibition against marital status discrimination would not, for instance, protect a
divorced woman who is denied housing because she is divorced. The court could reason
that protecting the plaintiff under the antidiscrimination measure might encourage divorce,
and thereby undermine the state's interest in marriage.
79. See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
80. But see Espinoza v. Thoma, 580 F.2d 346, 349 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that an
employer's antinepotism policy that prohibited spouses from working together could apply
to an unmarried couple in a marriage-like relationship).
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after the couple marries, however, one spouse can expect a termi-
nation or transfer notice when returning to work.8' The only change
worked by the wedding is in the couple's marital status, yet a court
applying the all-or-none rule in this scenario would find no marital
status discrimination in the spouse's instant termination. 82 One judge
has argued that such a rule might induce a couple to forego or even
dissolve a marriage, especially in a small town where one company
is the primary employer."3 Such a result clearly would derogate the
state's interest in promoting marriage. Yet courts applying the all-or-
none rule offer no explanation why the state's interest in marriage
is controlling in housing cases but not in employment cases.
This conflict is no less a problem for those courts adopting the
inclusive rule of marital status discrimination. At least one inclusive
rule jurisdiction has invoked the state's interest in marriage as a basis
for striking down antinepotism policies.84 The same jurisdiction,
however, subsequently held that the protection against marital status
discrimination extends to a plaintiff whose employment is terminated
because she lives with a nonspousal lover.85 If, as the first court rea-
soned, the antidiscrimination statute was designed to protect the status
of marriage, there is little justification for extending its provisions
to protect unmarried couples.
This apparent analytical conflict between the states' interest in
marriage and their prohibition of marital status discrimination has
not been resolved by any court. As a result, there is a significant gap
in the framework of marital status discrimination law leading to in-
consistent judicial application.
(2) Protection for the Couple Versus Protection for the Individual-
How Should the Issue be Framed?
The conflicting rules applied in marital status discrimination cases
suggest a common analytical problem: is the prohibition against mar-
ital status discrimination meart to protect individuals or couples?
Courts applying the all-or-none rule implicitly criticize the inclusive
81. See, e.g., Miller v. C.A. Muer Corp., 420 Mich. 355, 358-59, 362 N.W.2d 650, 651
(1984) (plaintiff, a restaurant waiter engaged to another employee, was told that after his
marriage he would have to quit, accept a transfer, or be discharged).
82. Id. at 364, 362 N.W.2d at 654 (antinepotism policy was not discriminatory on its
face).
83. Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 51
N.Y.2d 506, 515-16, 415 N.E.2d 950, 955, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961, 966 (1980) (Cooke, C.J.,
dissenting).
84. Kraft, Inc. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Minn. 1979), discussed supra text
accompanying notes 53-54.
85. State by Johnson v. Porter Farms, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. App. 1986).
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rule because it appears to protect unmarried relationships rather than
an individual's marital status. The all-or-none rule is thus an ana-
lytical tool used by these courts to severely restrict the protection
provided by prohibitions against marital status discrimination, a goal
they claim to be consistent with the legislative intent.
Courts applying the inclusive rule, on the other hand, refuse to
accept the all-or-none rule because it is underinclusive-allowing some
landlord, employer, or creditor policies to survive court challenge
despite their explicit, partial reliance on the plaintiff's marital status.
To be sure, when the inclusive rule is used to invalidate a housing
policy that forbids two unmarried individuals from living together,
the unmarried couple gains protection from the prohibition against
marital status discrimination. At the same time, however, the de-
fendant landlord is sanctioned for using a policy which includes a
prohibited classification, an important goal of antidiscrimination
measures . 6 This "broad view" suggests that although the primary
purpose of marital status discrimination laws is to protect the in-
dividual from arbitrary classification, a secondary effect may be the
protection of unmarried couples' interests. Even though courts ap-
plying the all-or-none rule have rejected the analytical tool of com-
paring married and unmarried couples, the analysis could be framed
differently to avoid the perceived problem of treating two unmarried
people as a family unit. In the employment setting, for instance, one
can make a strong argument that antinepotism policies place addi-
tional burdens on an applicant on the basis of her marital status. If
she is married, additional restrictions apply to her employment el-
igibility that do not apply to the similarly situated unmarried indi-
vidual. Likewise, the unmarried person applying for housing only
made available to married couples faces restrictions on her use of
the property that are not placed on a similarly situated married ap-
plicant. Therefore, even though courts applying the all-or-none rule
refuse to use an analysis that compares married and unmarried cou-
ples, it is unavoidably true that the policies in question draw dis-
tinctions between classes of people on the basis of marital status,
burdening some classes more than others.
II. Marital Status Discrimination: A Doctrine that Ought
to Protect Unmarried Couples
Part I of this Note has shown that given virtually identical facts
and substantially similar legislative directives, state courts have de-
86. See infra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
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veloped two very different analyses of marital status discrimination.
The divergence of views begins when the court frames the issue: The
all-or-none rule courts find that cases challenging antinepotism rules
and housing policies prohibiting unmarried couples from living to-
gether are about a plaintiff's choice of partner and the position of
that partner with respect to the plaintiff. To the inclusive rule courts,
on the other hand, those same cases are about whether the challenged
policy creates categories of individuals based on a protected status.
Part II of this Note argues that for a court to choose between
these two conflicting views of the issue it must examine: the express
intent of the legislature, the goals of civil rights statutes, and the
traditional discrimination doctrine formulated in other contexts. This
Part concludes that such an examination should lead state courts to
frame the marital status issue along the lines of the inclusive rule.
It suggests, however, that in order not to offend the strong policy
against arbitrary classifications embodied in prohibitions against
marital status discrimination, the inclusive rule must be refined. This
Part proposes a rule modeled on the traditional discrimination anal-
ysis formulated under the federal Constitution and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and explains how the conflict between a
state's interest in fostering marriage and its interest in prohibiting
marital status discrimination can be resolved.
A. The Inclusive Rule: An Approach Supported by Traditional
Discrimination Law
The right to be free from marital status discrimination is granted
statutorily by state legislatures.87 Thus, the meaning of that right must
be determined in light of the legislative intent behind the enactment.88
As stated earlier, the legislative history of marital status discrimi-
nation provisions has not been used to justify the adoption of the
inclusive rule or the all-or-none rule. If a court cannot find support
for its interpretation of a prohibition in that provision's own record
of enactment, therefore, the court should construe the prohibition
in the light of the antidiscrimination statute as a whole.
87. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
88. See e.g., Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd.,
51 N.Y.2d 506, 512-13, 415 N.E.2d 950, 953, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961, 964 (1980) (relying on a
legislative memorandum attached to the bill for guidance in constructing the term "marital
status"); Washington Water Power Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 91
Wash. 2d 62, 67-68, 586 P.2d 1149, 1153 (1978) (scope of right determined by examining
legislative intent in delegating authority to an administrative agency); McFadden v. Elma
Country Club, 26 Wash. App. 195, 205, 613 P.2d 146, 152 (1980) (relying on legislative
history and public policy in construing marital status discrimination).
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(1) The Legislative Intent Behind Antidiscrimination Statutes
In most states the prohibition against marital status discrimi-
nation has been added to existing human or civil rights laws that
already protected individuals from discrimination based on race, sex,
and national origin.8 9 These legislative directives instruct that em-
ployment, housing, and other business decisions must be based on
merit rather than arbitrary classifications. 9°
Many states consider the right to be free from discrimination on
the basis of statutorily specified classifications a civil right. 91 The
statutes themselves often contain descriptions of the legislative policy
and purpose behind their antidiscrimination measures. For instance,
Alaska's legislature states:
It is determined and declared as a matter of legislative finding that
discrimination against an inhabitant of the state because of race,
religion, color, national origin, age, sex, marital status, changes in
marital status, pregnancy, or parenthood is a matter of public con-
cern and that this discrimination not only threatens the rights and
privileges of the inhabitants of the state but also menaces the in-
stitutions of the state and threatens peace, order, health, safety and
general welfare of the state and its inhabitants. 92
The California legislature concluded that discrimination based on
race, religious creed, color, national origin, marital status, sex or age
"foments domestic strife and unrest, [and] deprives the state of the
fullest utilization of its capacities for development and advance." 93
Similarly, the New York legislature declared:
[T]he state has the responsibility to act to assure that every indi-
vidual within this state is afforded an equal opportunity to enjoy
a full and productive life and that the failure to provide such equal
opportunity, whether because of discrimination, prejudice, intol-
erance or inadequate education, training, housing or health care not
only threatens the rights and proper privileges of its inhabitants but
menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic state
and ... its inhabitants. 94
In light of the explicit purposes of these civil rights laws, the
addition of marital status discrimination provisions is most reason-
89. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
90. See Kraft, Inc. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Minn. 1979); Thompson v. Board
of Trustees, School Dist. No. 12, 192 Mont. 266, 270, 627"P.2d 1229, 1231 (1981).
91. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 18.60.210 (1986); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12921 (West 1980);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para. 2-102 (Smith-Hurd 1989); MicH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 37.22102
(West 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-1-102 (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1976);
N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 291 (McKinney 1982).
92. A.ASKA STAT. § 18.80.200(a) (Supp. 1990).
93. CAL. GOV'T CODE. § 12920 (West 1980).
94. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 290(3) (McKinney 1982).
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ably understood as the manifestation of legislative determination that
marital status discrimination is against public policy and dangerous
to the welfare of the state. 95 Moreover, these policy statements are
strong reminders to landlords, employers, certain businesses, and the
courts that significant harm is caused by policies that burden a pro-
tected class. 96
Despite such strong legislative statements condemning marital
status classifications, courts evaluating marital status cases under the
all-or-none rule allow employers to deny employment to an applicant
when her husband is employed by the company. 97 Although the chal-
lenged policy does not discriminate against all married persons, it
creates a subclass of individuals who cannot be employed because
they are married. 98 Thus, the employer's action infringes upon a pro-
tected classification and arguably was meant to be prohibited by the
legislature. 99 A similar infringement occurs when a subclass of un-
married individuals wishing to live with a partner are denied access
to housing made available to married couples.'0°
95. For other state legislative pronouncements on the importance of eliminating marital
status discrimination see ALASKA STAT. § 18.60.010 (1986); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12920 (West
1989); HAW. REv. STAT. § 368-1 (1985); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4552 (1989); MD.
AN. CODE art. 49B, § 14 (1979); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 598B.020 (Michie 1986); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West 1976); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 290 (McKinney 1982); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 34-37-1 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-715 (1987); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §
49.60.010 (1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.31 (West 1989).
96. See Kraft, Inc. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Minn. 1979) (an employment policy
that discriminates on the basis of marital status must withstand strict scrutiny).
97. See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
98. Id.
99. See Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 51
N.Y.2d 506, 515, 415 N.E.2d 950, 955, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961, 966 (1980) (Cooke, C.J.,
dissenting) (an antinepotism policy directly affects marital status, which is protected by
statute).
Significantly, the majority of state agencies charged with interpreting and applying the
states' civil rights laws, see supra note 29, have interpreted marital status discrimination
prohibitions under the inclusive theory. See, e.g., Atkisson v. Kern County Hous. Auth.,
59 Cal. App. 3d 89, 96, 130 Cal. Rptr. 375, 379 (1976) (a HUD circular sent to local
housing authority prohibited policy that automatically excluded unmarried cohabiting adults);
Prince George's County v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 49 Md. App. 314, 315-17, 431 A.2d 745,
746 (1981) (Human Relations Commission of Prince George County argued that cooperative's
policy denying membership to unmarried couples violated local marital status discrimination
ordinance); Thompson v. Sanborn's Motor Express, Inc., 154 N.J. Super. 555, 559, 382
A.2d 53, 55 (1977) (Civil Rights Division found that antinepotism policy unlawfully discrim-
inated on the basis of marital status); Manhattan Pizza Hut, 51 N.Y.2d at 511, 415 N.E.2d
at 952, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 903 (Human Rights Division argued that "marital status" includes
the identity or situation of an individual's spouse); Washington Water Power Co. v.
Washington State Human Rights Comm'n., 91 Wash. 2d 62, 69, 586 P.2d 1149, 1153 (1978)
(State Human Rights Commission argued that the legislature did not intend to restrict
coverage to situations in which employer refuses to hire a person solely because she is
married or unmarried).
100. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
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By allowing employers and landlords to use explicit marital status
classifications, all-or-none jurisdictions permit the use of stereotypes
and arbitrary prejudices as a part of the business decisionmaking
process. For instance, an employer might choose to use marital status
as an indicator to determine how likely it is an employee will remain
in the same geographical location, if an employee will be able to take
long business trips away from home, what relationship the employee
will have with other employees, or if the employee will be "com-
mitted" and "stable."11 Landlords might be interested in a pro-
spective tenant's marital status to discover the number of people who
will occupy the residence, the level of noise and the possibility of
numerous guests at the residence, the likelihood that the rent will be
paid regularly, the possibility of children living in the residence, or
the morality or immorality of the applicant's lifestyle.102 But the in-
formation prospective landlords and employers supposedly glean from
inquiring about an applicant's marital status could be learned more
accurately through other, more specific, questions. 03 Implicit in the
use of marital status as a shorthand method of determining a per-
son's lifestyle and personality is the notion that all married people
or all single people behave or think in a certain way. Reliance on
stereotypes is exactly what the state legislatures expressly intended
to prohibit by enacting human rights laws: "Civil rights acts seek
to prevent discrimination against a person because of stereotyped
impressions about the characteristics of a class to which the person
belongs .... [Such legislation] seeks to eliminate the effects of of-
fensive or demeaning stereotypes . . . . "4
Policies that treat married and unmarried couples differently
also are demeaning to unmarried, lesbian, and gay couples. 10 5 Such
101. See, e.g., Bradsher, Young Men Pressed To Wed for Success, N.Y. Times, Dec.
13, 1989, at 1, col. 4 (suggesting that employers "tend to perceive married men as more
stable, more dedicated to their careers, better able to get along with others, and less likely
to cost the company money by changing jobs!' and that single women are perceived as being
more able to "concentrate fully on their work").
102. See Bayer, Rationality-and the Irrational Underinclusiveness of the Civil Rights
Laws, 45 WAsH. & LEE L. Rv. 1, 93-94 (1988) (arguing that inquiries about marital status
may result in decisions based on "personal distaste, misinformed stereotyping or both").
103. In some cases, inquiries about marital status might be used to discriminate against
individuals on some other basis. For instance, an employer wishing to avoid hiring a woman
who may become pregnant might use the woman's marital status as an indicator of the
likelihood that she will become pregnant. A person's marital status also might be used to
help the employer decide if the applicant is homosexual. See, e.g., Bradsher, supra note 103
at 1, col 4 ("[M]anagers sometimes have prejudices against hiring or promoting homosex-
uals, and assume that married men are heterosexual, career counselors said.").
104. Miller v. C.A. Muer Corp., 420 Mich. 355, 362-63, 362 N.W.2d 650, 653-54 (1984)
(citations omitted).
105. This problem is shown when courts apply the all-or-none rule in discrimination
cases.
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policies lend credence to the stereotype that nonmarital relationships
are transitory, frivolous, morally reprehensible, or simply unimpor-
tant. 10 6 These stereotypes are grounded in marital status classifica-
tions that arbitrarily define relationships in purely legal, as opposed
to factual, terms. As more individuals develop significant and stable
bonds without the marriage label, marital status classifications will
be an increasingly inaccurate means of categorizing relationships.
The inclusive rule therefore, best effectuates the strong public policy
against the use of arbitrary classifications because it forces employers
and landlords to base their decisions on an applicant's qualifications,
rather than on preconceived notions about how married or single
persons act.
(2) Traditional Discrimination Analysis
The previous section of this Note showed that prohibitions of
marital status discrimination occur most often within statutes pro-
hibiting discrimination based on other classifications, such as race,
sex, and national origin.10 7 Although the application of the prohi-
bition against marital status discrimination is relatively new, there
is a rich case history in the areas of race and sex discrimination that
is instructive on how prohibitions against discrimination should be
analyzed. In this section, antinepotism policies prohibiting spouses
from working for the same employer will be compared to hypo-
.thetical and actual employment discrimination cases based on race
and gender.
For the purposes of this comparison it is important to under-
stand how the employer constructs and applies an antinepotism pol-
icy. The typical antinepotism policy or no-spouse rule, as exemplified
in Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Ap-
peals Board,10 8 is used to terminate or deny employment when two
criteria are satisfied. First, the applicant must be married; second,
her partner (in this case her spouse) must be employed by the em-
ployer promulgating the policy. °9 The justification for such a policy
106. For an example of judicial stereotyping regarding the value of nonmarital relation-
ships, see Prince George's County v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 49 Md. App. 314 passim, 431
A.2d 745 passim (1981).
107. See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 9-13 (cataloging
state marital status discrimination provisions) .
108. 51 N.Y.2d 506, 415 N.E.2d 950, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1979).
109. For the purposes of this section the construction of the second criteria has been
altered slightly from that used by the New York court in Manhattan Pizza Hut. In that
case, the court stated that the second half of the policy worked to deny employment when
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is the employer's belief that two people who are involved in an in-
timate, long-term relationship and who work together may favor each
other for promotion or other employment benefits and may bring
domestic disputes into the workplace.
EXHIBIT A
Employment Policies That Use Protected Classifications
to Limit Employment Opportunities
A B C
Prohibited Classification Nonprohibited Additional Stated Reason
Used in Policy Factor for Policy
1. Married applicants whose spouse works for the eliminate favoritism in the
same employer workplace
2. African American appli- who are applying on an reduce influx of applicants
cants odd-numbered day of the
month
3. Female applicants who are married reduce marital tension cre-
ated by long absences
Exhibit A illustrates the antinepotism policy at line one. As the
Exhibit shows, the criteria in column A represent classifications pro-
tected by state law. The criteria in column B, applied only to the
protected class, are not prohibited by state law. If the criteria in col-
umn B were applied to all employees, therefore, they still would be
legally permissible.
In courts adopting the all-or-none rule, employers have suc-
cessfully argued that only those applicants who have spouses working
for the same employer are burdened by the policy and therefore no
marital status discrimination has occurred." 0 In adopting this con-
clusion, the court considers only the criterion in line 1, column B,
of the Exhibit determinative in the employment decision. The court's
conclusion is bolstered by the close fit between the policy's non-
prohibited criterion and its legitimate justification."' In this analysis,
the applicant's spouse worked for the same employer. Id. at 514, 415 N.E.2d at 954, 434
N.Y.S.2d at 965. By using the word "spouse" to describe the identity of the employee, the
court and the employer imported a marital status classification into the second criteria of
the policy. The employer's stated justification for the rule, however, was "[t]o prohibit
employment relationships which can cause problems for the Company or for individuals."
Id. at 513, 415 N.E.2d at 954, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 965. Based on this explicit justification,
and to make the strongest case on behalf of the employer, the wording of the second criteria
has been changed to remove the prohibited classification.
110. See supra text following note 38.
111. See, e.g., Manhattan Pizza Hut, 51 N.Y.2d at 513, 415 N.E.2d at 954, 434 N.Y.S.2d
at 965.
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the court dismisses the first column criterion, which is expressly a
marital status classification, reasoning that since not all married ap-
plicants are affected the classification is permissible. Thus, these courts
have concluded that since the policy, if applied to all employees,
would not be prohibited under state law, it is not discriminatory to
apply that policy to only a portion of a protected class. Such an ex-
traordinary analysis stands alone against the great weight of au-
thority in other employment discrimination cases.
a. A Comparison to Employment Discrimination Based on Race and
Sex
A hypothetical employment policy with the same characteristics
as the antinepotism rule discussed above is created easily. Suppose,
for example, that a large manufacturing employer regularly receives
a deluge of employment applications for a relatively small number
of regularly available positions. To ease the strain on employees who
must review these applications, the employer institutes a two-pronged
policy, illustrated at line two of Exhibit A. The policy states that
applications received from African Americans will be accepted only
on odd-numbered days of the month. The first prong of the policy
clearly invokes a racial classification prohibited by state and federal
law." 2 The second prong is not legally prohibited, "3 and the stated
justification for the policy clearly fits with the policy's second cri-
terion. A court applying the all-or-none rule would find that the pol-
icy is not racially discriminatory because it does not burden all African
Americans, only those applying on certain days. Given such an anal-
ysis, the court would conclude that the employer made its adverse
decision based on the date the application was tendered, not on the
race of the applicant. 114 Of course, under established race discrim-
ination jurisprudence, no modern-day court would be so bold as to
make such a suggestion.
In Loving v. Virginia,"5 the United States Supreme Court ruled
that antimiscegenation statutes violated the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment." 6 The state of Virginia argued that
112. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(a) (West 1980); 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e (1988).
113. An employer could implement a legitimate policy limiting the number of days it
would consider employment applications.
114. In Thomson v. Sanborn's Motor Express, Inc., 154 N.J. Super. 555, 561, 382 A.2d
53, 56 (1977), the court upheld the challenged antinepotism policy, concluding: "Her
employment was terminated because of her relationship to another employee, not because
of her marital status."
115. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
116. Id. at 12.
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because the statute equally burdened both spouses of the interracial
marriage, the statute did not discriminate on the basis of race."17 Re-
jecting this argument, the Court focused on the specific racial clas-
sification contained in the statute and strictly scrutinized the state's
justification for the classification." 8 The state might have argued that
the challenged law did not burden all white or black people, but only
those individuals who chose to enter an interracial marriage. Such
an argument clearly would not have affected the Court's decision,
however, because the Court made clear that it could not ignore the
statute's explicit racial classification."19 In relation to column A of
Exhibit A, therefore, the Court clarified that a crucial factor in an-
alyzing allegedly discriminatory policies is whether the policy ex-
plicitly uses a prohibited classification.
Interpretations of statutory prohibitions against race discrimi-
nation reach the same conclusion. For instance, in McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green,'20 the Supreme Court created the now well-
established test for proving unlawful disparate treatment based on
race under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.121 To make out
a prima facie case of racial discrimination, the plaintiff must show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected and (iv) that,
after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qual-ifications. 12
An African American plaintiff bringing suit against an employer that
had instituted the policy in line two of Exhibit A would have little
trouble meeting her burden under the McDonnell Douglas test, de-
spite the fact that not all African Americans are affected by the pol-
icy. Likewise, if a similar test were used under a state
antidiscrimination law, a qualified married plaintiff challenging an
antinepotism policy would be able to establish a prima facie case of
illegal discrimination, despite the fact that the policy did not burden
all married applicants.
A special class of sex-discrimination cases under Title VII also
provides a telling criticism of the all-or-none rule. In Phillips v. Mar-
tin Marrietta Corp.,'23 the United States Supreme Court reviewed an
117. Id. at 8.
118. Id. at 8-9.
119. Id. at 10-11.
120. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e (1988).
122. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
123. 400 U.S. 542 (1970).
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employer's policy that denied employment to women with preschool
age children but not to similarly situated men. The Court held that
Title VII did not permit employers to implement different hiring cri-
teria for men and women unless the employer could show that the
differing criteria were based on a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation. 124 The Phillips decision has been used by several courts to
invalidate policies that impose additional requirements on female ap-
plicants. 125 The rationale behind this decision was explored further
in Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 126 in which a female plaintiff
challenged an airline policy requiring that all female stewardesses
remain unmarried. This policy is illustrated in line three of Exhibit
A. As with the previous two examples, the policy combined a pro-
hibited and a permitted classification. 27 In Sprogis, the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that although only a subclass of women was affected by
the policy, it violated the prohibition against sex discrimination. The
court concluded, "'It does not seem to us relevant that the rule is
not directed against all females, but only against married females,
for so long as sex is a factor in the application of the rule, such ap-
plication involves a discrimination based on sex." 28 Moreover, the
court rejected the argument that Title VII should apply only when
explicit discrimination is based "solely" on sex. 29 As Exhibit A il-
lustrates, antinepotism policies that rely on marital status classifi-
cations are no different in their construction or application from "sex-
plus" employment policies which have been struck down under Title
VII. Both policies use an impermissible classification coupled with
a permissible one to discriminate against a subclass of the protected
group. The Phillips and Sprogis decisions, and their progeny, flatly
124. Id. at 544.
125. These decisions have become known as "sex-plus" discrimination cases. See B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW ch. 12, § VI, at 403 & n. 169
(2d ed. 1983).
126. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971).
127. In comparing United's policy to the other policies shown in Exhibit A, it is important
to note that marital status is considered a nonprohibited classification in cases brought
solely under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
128. Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1198 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.3(a) (1970)) (emphasis added).
129. Id. The Court noted that Congress explicitly rejected the addition of the word
"solely" when it enacted Title VII and, therefore, concluded that such a restrictive inter-
pretation of the statute would be contrary to Congress' intent. Id. at 1198 & n.4 (citing 110
CONG. REc. 2728, 13,825 (1964)).
Notably, the courts adopting the all-or-none rule in marital status cases have interpreted
the antidiscrimination measures to apply to discrimination based "solely" on marital status,
despite the conspicuous absence of the word "solely" in the text of the statute. See supra
notes 24-37 and accompanying text.
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reject the notion that every member of a protected class must be
burdened before the policy will be held discriminatory. 30
b. A Comparison to Mixed-Motive Discrimination
The antinepotism policy and the other policies discussed above
share a common characteristic: each involves a combination of le-
gally legitimate and illegitimate elements. In this way, they are anal-
ogous to the mixed-motive discharge analyzed by the Supreme Court
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.'3' In that case, the plaintiff alleged
that she was denied a partnership at Price Waterhouse in violation
of Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination. 32 The Court
concluded, however, that Price Waterhouse had both a permissible
and an impermissible reason for denying the partnership to Ms. Hop-
kins. The Court held that the company legitimately could deny part-
nership because Hopkins had difficulty getting along with her co-
workers but could not deny partnership because she did not behave
in a stereotypically female way.' 33 The Court concluded that both
reasons were factors in the decision and remanded the case for fur-
ther hearings.' 34 The partnership decision in Hopkins involved a mix-
ture of legitimate and illegitimate criteria. Similarly, an antinepotism
policy may mix impermissible marital status classifications with per-
missible efforts to eliminate family favoritism from the workplace.
The Court's analysis in Hopkins strongly affirmed the purpose
of Title VII "to condemn even those decisions based on a mixture
of legitimate and illegitimate considerations."' 35 As in Sprogis v.
United Airlines, Inc.,' 36 the Hopkins Court emphasized that Title VII
provides relief even when the use of a prohibited classification is not
the "sole" reason for the adverse employment decision.' 37 For the
plaintiff to establish wrongful discrimination by the employer, she
only need prove that a prohibited classification was a "motivating"
factor in the challenged decision.' 3 Assuming the employer does not
130. Citing two unpublished EEOC decisions, Schlei and Grossman note that the analysis
in "sex-plus" cases also is applied in race discrimination cases. See B. ScmHni & P. GRossMA ,
supra note 125, at 290 & nn.3 & 7.
131. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
132. Id. at 231-32.
133. Id. at 250-52.
134. Id. at 258.
135. Id. at 241.
136. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971).
137. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 241.
138. Id. at 249-50.
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argue that the adverse decision was based on a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification, it can only avoid liability if it can prove that the
same decision would have been made absent the discriminatory mo-
tive. 3 9 Throughout the Hopkins opinion, the Court reiterated the
important role of Title VII in eliminating the use of certain bases
for distinguishing among employees, even when prohibited and le-
gitimate considerations are mixed. 140
Federal courts' analyses of what properly is considered discrim-
ination on the basis of a prohibited classification offer important
guidance to state courts. State antidiscrimination laws often parallel
the wording of Title VII,' 4' and state courts routinely have looked
to federal interpretations of Title VII in construing the meaning and
application of state law. 42 The federal cases leave no doubt that the
all-or-none rule pioneered by the New York Court of Appeals in
Manhattan Pizza Hut 43 is unacceptably narrow and dangerously
emasculatory of antidiscrimination measures. Furthermore, singling
out marital status discrimination for more restrictive interpretation
than race or sex discrimination makes no sense in light of the fact
that most state legislatures have included their prohibition of marital
status discrimination within the same sentence as their provisions
prohibiting race and sex discrimination.'" The fact that a legislature
has added "marital status" to an existing statute with a specific case
history and application shows that it intended that marital status be
considered in the same manner as the other prohibited classifications.
B. A Refined Formulation of Marital Status Discrimination
The following section proposes a refined inclusive rule of marital
status discrimination consistent with traditional discrimination anal-
139. Id. at 242.
140. See, e.g., id. at 239-41.
141. Compare, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e-2 (1988) with CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(a) (West
1980) and N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296(1) (McKinney 1982) and WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §
49.60.180 (1990).
142. See, e.g., Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights v. Yellow Cab, 611 P.2d 487,
490 (1980) (using the McDonnell Douglas disparate treatment test developed under Title VII
to interpret Alaska's prohibition against race discrimination in employment); New York Div.
of Human Rights v. Killian Mfg., 35 N.Y.2d 201, 209 (1974) (relying on disparate impact
and treatment models developed under Title VII to interpret employment discrimination
provisions of New York state law); Dep't of Fair Employment and Hous., v. Church's Fried
Chicken, Inc., No. 90-11 (Cal. Dep't of Fair Employment & Hous., Aug. 16, 1990) (decision
of state agency comparing state equal opportunity laws with the provisions of Title VII to
develop a more liberal analysis than that adopted under Title VII in employment discrimi-
nation cases.)
143. 51 N.Y.2d 506, 415 N.E.2d 950, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1980).
144. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text; supra notes 89-96 and accompanying
text.
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ysis. It also proposes a resolution to the perceived conflict between
the state's interest in marriage and the prohibition against marital
status discrimination.
(1) The Protected Class and a Sine Qua Non Test
Antidiscrimination statutes attempt to prohibit the use of certain
classifications as a factor in business decisions. Thus, laws prohib-
iting marital status discrimination should apply whenever a statu-
torily protected class of persons is defined by marital status for
decisionmaking purposes.145 If marital status is a factor considered
under the challenged policy, and the aggrieved person would not have
been harmed but for her marital status, the policy should be found
invalid as marital status discrimination. 46
It is important to emphasize that the court should apply this
proposed "but-for" test to decide whether marital status was a mo-
tivating factor in the challenged decisionmaking; the plaintiff should
not be required to prove that marital status was the sole reason for
the challenged decision.147 Although the analysis under a state pro-
hibition of marital status discrimination should be similar to the anal-
ysis under the state's race and sex discrimination provisions, the state
courts also ought to consider the Supreme Court's discrimination
jurisprudence for guidance. Specifically, once the plaintiff has made
a prima facia case that marital status was a motivating factor in the
adverse decision, the defendant should have the burden of proving
that the same decision would have been made absent consideration
of the plaintiff's marital status. 148 If the defendant cannot meet that
burden, the plaintiff will effectively have shown the necessary "but-
for" causation. 149 Paralleling traditional race and sex discrimination
analysis, this test is designed to prevent decisionmakers from using
an arbitrary marital status classification to distinguish among in-
dividuals.
145. See Atkisson v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 59 Cal. App. 3d 89, 96, 130 Cal. Rptr.
375, 379 (1976); see also Hess v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 138 Cal. App. 3d
232, 187 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1982); Whirlpool Corp. v. Civil Rights Comm'n, 425 Mich. 527,
533-34, 390 N.W.2d 625, 628 (1986) (Archer, J., dissenting).
146. For similar tests, see Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co., 605 F.2d 566, 569
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (marital status discrimination occurs when persons are treated differently,
"'all other facts being the same, because of their marital status . . . ."') (quoting Brief for
Defendant); Thompson v. Board of Trustees, School Dist. No. 12, 192 Mont. 266, 270, 627
P.2d 1229, 1231 (1981) (using a sine qua non rationale to find marital status discrimination).
147. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
148. Id. at 249.
149. See id.
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This refined test presents a clear and well-established method for
determining whether a challenged policy uses an impermissible, in-
vidious classification based on marital status. As such, it puts to rest
the debate over whether or not the courts should compare similarly
situated married and unmarried couples. Any action taken by a land-
lord or employer that disadvantages a couple on the basis of their
marital status, also disadvantages each individual in the couple by
imposing additional restrictions or requirements because of the in-
dividual's decision to be married or unmarried. Such a policy creates
a class of people defined, in part, by their choice of marital status.
Whether or not a court chooses to compare the couples or the in-
dividuals in a class, the result must be the same-a finding of marital
status discrimination. By adopting this test, therefore, the courts cor-
rectly would be opening the door for unmarried couples to challenge
certain actions taken against them by private employers, landlords,
creditors, and owners of public accommodations.
(2) Reconciling State's interest in Marriage with Prohibitions Against
Marital Status Discrimination
The question remains what balance this refined analysis strikes
between the human rights goal of prohibiting marital status discrim-
ination and the state's interest in promoting marriage. The answer
to this question must lie in the explicit prohibition adopted by the
state legislatures.
By enacting human rights laws to prevent marital status dis-
crimination, legislators have limited the ability of certain individuals
to use marital status to differentiate among people. Of course, the
state may pass legislation that disproportionately benefits married
couples because it has a legally cognizable interest in promoting mar-
riage. 150 Since marriage is a legally created union, lawmakers should
decide what benefits and obligations to confer on married couples.
The state, through its legislature, is in the best position to define the
scope and effect of its interest in marriage.
Conversely, employers, landlords, and owners of public accom-
modations (depending on the scope of a state's legislation) have not
150. See generally Rivera, supra note 1; see also Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals
Bd., 34 Cal. 3d 1, 16, 663 P.2d 904, 914, 192 Cal. Rptr. 134, 144 (1983) (Broussard, J.,
dissenting) ("when the Legislature intends to deny benefits to nonmarital partners, it does
so expressly."); Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin., 167 Cal. App. 3d 516, 527,
213 Cal. Rptr. 410, 417 (1985) ("The state's public policy favoring marriage is promoted
by conferring statutory rights upon married persons which are not afforded unmarried
partners.").
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been entrusted with the authority to define the scope of or benefits
derived from the state's interest in marriage. In fact, prohibitions
against marital status discrimination explicitly limit the ability of
business entities to reward or penalize people based on their marital
status. State legislatures enacted human rights laws to prevent such
entities from imposing arbitrary and sometimes moralistic policies on
individuals and to require those entities to base their decisions on
merit and legitimate business concerns."
III. Application of the Modified Inclusive Rule
The proposed modified inclusive rule departs significantly from
the traditional all-or-none rule of marital status discrimination. It
also offers greater protection than that provided by the established
inclusive rule. This Part illustrates how the new test should operate.
It points out a few cases that appear to have adopted this test and
defines the scope of protection the new test affords unmarried cou-
ples.
A. Employment Policies
The most often litigated employment policy under marital status
discrimination law is the antinepotism or no-relatives policy.'5 2 Some
antidiscrimination statutes provide an exception for policies that use
a protected classification when the classification is considered a bona
fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).' 53 This exception provides
the employer with an opportunity to justify the antinepotism policy
as reasonably necessary to the business. 54 In a number of jurisdic-
tions, where antinepotism policies are held not to be a BFOQ or no
BFOQ is allowed, employers would be required to reformulate their
policies under the refined inclusive test to eliminate marital status
151. See Thompson v. Board of Trustees, School Dist. No. 12, 192 Mont. 266, 270, 627
P.2d 1229, 1231 (1981); see also Ziegler, Beliefs No Basis to Turn Down Renters, Panel
Says, L.A. Daily J., Aug. 21, 1989, at 4, col. 2 (California Fair Employment and Housing
Commission ruled that landlords may not refuse to rent to unmarried couples because of a
religious belief that nonmarital sex is sinful).
152. See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., Kraft, Inc. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 386, 388-89 (Minn. 1979) (holding
antinepotism policy presumptively invalid, but remanding case for factual determination of
whether the policy might fall under the statutory exception for a BFOQ); Manhattan Pizza
Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 51 N.Y.2d 506, 516, 415 N.E.2d
950, 955, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961, 966 (1979) (Cooke, C.J. dissenting) (arguing that an antinepotism
policy violates marital status discrimination provision unless employer can justify policy as
a BFOQ).
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discrimination.' Most antinepotism policies first define a class of
people who are married and then act to discriminate against a sub-
group of that class.15 6 Because such a policy uses a protected clas-
sification, it would violate the prohibition against marital status
discrimination. Although such a policy would be found illegal under
the refined inclusive rule, the employer could still create a policy that
proscribes certain kinds of relationships that interfere with the pro-
ductivity or morale of employees. 15 7 The employer still would be able
to prevent employees involved in intimate relationships from working
together. To survive a challenge of marital status discrimination,
however, the employer's policy would have to apply equally to mar-
ried and unmarried employees.
Other employer policies also are subject to attack under the pro-
posed test. For instance, employers often extend more fringe benefits
to married employees than to unmarried employees. A poignant ex-
ample of this is the common practice of allowing a married employee
funeral leave in the event her spouse dies but disallowing an un-
married employee funeral leave when her unmarried partner dies. In
fact, the unmarried employee might be terminated for taking time
off to attend her loved one's funeral if she chooses to leave without
claiming to be sick or on vacation." 8 Such policies would be inval-
idated under the proposed test since married employees receive a ben-
efit unavailable to unmarried employees. 59
155. Certainly the mixture of close personal relationships and the supervisor-super-
visee role may create friction between the persons involved and resentment among
co-workers. The addition of "marital status" to the categories of proscribed
discrimination . . . did not declare concern about such potential conflicts to be
unfounded. The amendment did, however, place bounds on the methods that
could be used to limit or prevent such conflicts .... An employer should be free
to prevent personal relationships between supervisors and other employees from
disrupting the work environment through rules focused on such a problem, not
by unwarranted interference with a protected status.
Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 51 N.Y.2d 506,
515-16, 415 N.E.2d 950, 955-56, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961, 966-67 (1980) (Cooke, C.J., dissenting).
156. See supra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
157. A simple example of an antinepotism policy that would not offend the proposed
marital status discrimination law would be a prohibition against a supervisor and a subor-
dinate living together in the same household. Because the policy does not use a marital
status classification, it is unlikely that applying the proposed "but-for" test would result in
a finding that marital status discrimination had occurred. Whether or not the two people
are involved in an intimate relationship, the fact that they live together might indicate a
high likelihood of nepotism.
158. In an attempt to remedy this problem, several cities have enacted or attempted to
enact domestic partnership laws that require employers to provide equal bereavement leave
to married employees and unmarried domestic partners. See, e.g., Domestic Partner is New
Addition to the 'Family:' California Cities Set Trend, L.A. Daily J., July 11, 1989, at 1,
col. 2 (noting that such laws exist in West Hollywood and Berkeley, California).
159. A simple solution to this problem is to allow every employee the opportunity to
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The application of prohibitions against marital status discrim-
ination to the administration of health plans is more controversial.
Arguably, married employees who have spousal coverage through a
company medical plan are more highly compensated than single em-
ployees.'16 A married employee is given the benefit of a group rate
for medical coverage for herself and her spouse, whereas an un-
married employee receives group medical coverage only for herself.
Moreover, the employer usually pays the premium for both the em-
ployee and the spouse. Because spousal health coverage has real ec-
onomic value that only is given to married employees, they are
compensated at a higher rate than unmarried employees based on a
prohibited classification unrelated to their work performance. Such-
unequal compensation would appear to violate the prohibition against
marital status discrimination.16 '
Under the proposed marital status discrimination test, many em-
ployer health benefit plans would be invalid. Unless legislatures amend
the marital status discrimination statutes to exempt health plans, em-
ployers face two alternatives. They could choose to stop offering
spousal benefits to married employees, thus equally failing to com-
pensate married and unmarried employees providing for another's
health care. Or the employer could implement a policy that com-
pensates married and unmarried couples equally by offering optional
coverage for one other person in the employee's household and the
employee's children.' 62 To some employers such a measure represents
name one person with whom they have special, emotional ties. If the named person should
die, funeral leave would be granted.
160. See Bowen & Wadley, Designing a Strategic Benefits Program, 21 CoMPENsATIoN
& BEaNmnFrs REv. 44, 44-47 (1989) (arguing that an employer's contribution to an employee's
medical and disability insurance plan is an integral part of that employee's compensation
and therefore, married employees are compensated at a higher rate than single employees).
161. California, however, has directly addressed this issue by specifically exempting the
award of spousal benefits from the prohibition of marital status discrimination. See CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 12940(a)(3) (West Supp. 1989) ("Nothing in this part relating to discrimination
on account of marital status shall ... prohibit bona fide health plans from providing
additional or greater benefits to employees with dependents than to those employees without
or with-fewer dependents."); see also CAL. ADimt. CODE, tit. 2, § 7292.6 (1990) (regulations
of Fair Employment and Housing Commission).
The fact that the legislature added this proviso indicates two important points. First, the
legislature recognized that without the exception the prohibition of marital status discrimi-
nation in employment could be interpreted as forbidding the extension of benefits to an
employee's spouse. Second, the explicit exception of health plans supports the argument
that the legislature expressly delineates when married couples may be treated differently in
employment. Thus, legislative silence should be interpreted as a directive that individuals
shall not be treated differently based on their marital status.
162. Thus, married couples still could get spousal coverage and unmarried couples could
claim benefits for their significant others. Furthermore, if the employer was concerned about
frequent changes in the beneficiary, she could limit the number of times an employee could
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a fundamental change in the administration of fringe benefits plans.
For others, the process of removing arbitrary marital status classi-
fications from employee benefit plans already is underway. 63 What-
ever its administrative costs may be, this approach is consistent with
the intent of the human rights statutes that people not be treated
differently on the basis of a protected classification unrelated to merit.
As the types of relationships that qualified employees enter change
and diversify, employers also will have an economic incentive to elim-
inate distinctions based on marital status.
B. Public Accommodations
A few states prohibit marital status discrimination in public ac-
commodations such as hotels, museums, health clubs, hospitals, and
airlines. One particular concern of unmarried couples is hospital pol-
icies that limit facility access to spouses or relatives of the patient's
family. Such policies allow hospital officials to exclude a patient's
partner if the couple is not married. For instance, in Whitman v.
Mercy-Memorial Hospital, 164 the hospital sought to deny the plaintiff
admission to a delivery room during the birth of his child because
he was not married to the child's mother. 65 The court, using an in-
change the named beneficiary. As long as the plan does not use marital status as the criteria
for categorizing relationships, the policy could not be challenged as marital status discrim-
ination.
Alternatively, two commentators have suggested that an employer could restructure her
benefits so that employees are equally compensated. See Bowen & Wadley, supra note 162,
at 44. The employer could offer a salary reflecting the maximum amount she is willing to
pay the employee. This figure includes the amount of money the employer is willing to
contribute to the employee's benefits. For example, suppose that prior to reorganization,
the employer paid an entry level employee $30,000 annually with a fixed benefit package
worth between $6,000 and $10,000 each year. The employer would be paying a higher
amount for a married employee who claimed her spouse on the company plan than for a
single employee-a practice which arguably compensates the married employee at a higher
rate. After reorganization of the benefit plan, the employer could offer each employee a
base salary of $40,000, and allow each employee the option to "buy" certain benefits, such
as health or life insurance up to a certain maximum amount (perhaps $10,000). Each
employee then would be "charged" the correct actuarial amount for the coverage she needs.
The choice of benefits could include health insurance for spouses, domestic partners, and
single people-each employee choosing only the benefits she would like. As a result, each
employee would receive the same total compensation regardless of her marital status. This
reorganization, therefore, would not discriminate on the basis of marital status.
163. See, e.g., Sandalow, SF Firms Contemplating Live-In Partner Benefits, Some Big
Companies Reviewing Their Policies, San Francisco Chron., Jan. 22, 1991, at A3, col. 2;
Jackson, Woodies to Extend Benefits, Unmarried Partners to Get Discounts, Washington
Post, Feb. 15, 1990, at El, col. 5; see also Freudenheim, Rising Worry on 'Partner' Benefits,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1989, at DI, col. 3.
164. 128 Mich. App. 155, 339 N.W.2d 730 (1983).
165. Id. at 157, 339 N.W.2d at 731.
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clusive rule analysis, held that the hospital's policy of excluding non-
spouses from the delivery room discriminated on the basis of marital
status and, therefore, was invalid. 66
There are many other possible applications of the refined in-
clusive rule of marital status discrimination. At least one report has
documented routine marital status discrimination in a wide range of
services provided by private industry. 67 Marital status is used com-
monly in our society as a classification to grant benefits and burdens
to a particular segment of the population involved in committed re-
lationships. Such arbitrary classifications shut out a growing number
of people who have chosen significant relationships outside the legal
institution of marriage.' 6 Owners of public accommodations should
be put on notice that, to comply with the prohibition against marital
status discrimination, they may no longer ignore nontraditional fam-
ilies when offering benefits to spouses.
C. Marital Status Discrimination and Same Sex Couples
This Note has attempted to show that policies treating married
and unmarried couples differently should be invalidated under state
prohibitions of marital status discrimination. Another question, how-
ever, remains: are lesbian and gay couples protected by these pro-
hibitions when they are denied benefits available to married people?
The question is complicated by the fact that gays and lesbians legally
may not marry in any state. 169 Moreover, it may be difficult to de-
termine whether discriminatory actions against gay people are based
on marital status, sexual orientation, or both.
(1) Marital Status Discrimination Cases Involving Lesbian and Gay
Couples
At least one court has held that a gay couple may not claim
marital status discrimination when denied access to housing available
to married couples and immediate family.' 70 The court found that
166. Id. at 160, 339 N.W.2d at 732.
167. OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY, CONSUMER TASK FORCE ON MARITAL STATUS Dis-
CRIUNATiON, FINAL REPORT (Los Angeles, Cal. Mar. 29, 1990) (finding marital status
discrimination in housing, insurance, credit, airlines, the funeral industry, hospitals, health
clubs, travel clubs, country clubs and in newspaper obituary policies) [hereinafter MARITAL
STATUS REPORT].
168. Id. at 7-9.
169. See supra note 5.
170. Evangelista Assoc. v. Bland, 117 Misc. 2d 558, 559, 458 N.Y.S.2d 996, 997 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1983).
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any discrimination against a gay tenant "could only fairly be char-
acterized as discrimination based upon sexual or affectional pref-
erence, a status not protected [under state law]."' 7'
On the other hand, a few jurisdictions have held that same sex
roommates may bring a cause of action based on marital status dis-
crimination.172 In Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency,' 73 a
landlord told the plaintiff that she would not rent an apartment to
two unmarried female applicants. 14 The New Jersey court found that
the plaintiff had been denied the housing opportunity based on her
sex and marital status and concluded that prohibitions against mar-
ital status discrimination were intended "inter alia, to insure the rights
of two persons of the same sex who constitutef] themselves into a
housekeeping unit." 75
A more probing analysis of the relationship between lesbian and
gay plaintiffs and the prohibition against marital status discrimi-
nation was provided in Hinman v. Department of Personnel Ad-
ministration.76 In Hinman, a gay state employee challenged the
administration of the State Employee's Health Care Act 177 under the
California constitution's equal protection clause. The plaintiff con-
tended that an agency interpretation of the Health Care Act, allowing
spouses of state employees to receive dental benefits but denying the
same benefits to unmarried partners of homosexual employees, un-
lawfully discriminates against homosexual families. 7  California
marriage law prohibits same-sex couples from marrying, and the ad-
ministration of the Health Care Act only allows married couples to
receive benefits. Therefore, Hinman argued, the classification of those
benefiting under the plan was, in effect, based not only on marital
status but also on sexual orientation.179 The state's plan thus ad-
versely affected lesbian and gay couples.
171. Id. at 559, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 997 (quoting 420 East 80th Co. v. Chin, 115 Misc. 2d
195, 455 N.Y.S.2d 42 (N.Y. App. Term. 1982)). This case was decided in a jurisdiction
following the all-or-none rule of marital status discrimination in housing. Therefore, the
court relied on precedent holding that an unmarried heterosexual couple could not claim
marital status discrimination in a similar factual scenario.
172. See Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 62 N.J. 399, 301 A.2d 754 (1973);
See also Bachman v. State Div. of Human Rights, 104 A.D.2d 111, 481 N.Y.S.2d 858 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1984).
173. 62 N.J. 399, 301 A.2d 754 (1973).
174. Id. at 402-03, 301 A.2d at 756.
175. Id. at 405, 301 A.2d at 757 (quoting with approval the decision of the Division on
Civil Rights).
176. 167 Cal. App. 3d 516, 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1985).
177. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 22950-22958 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991).
178. Hinman, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 519, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
179. Id. at 523-24, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 414-15.
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The Hinman court upheld the dismissal of this claim, refusing
to recognize that lesbian and gay couples can be similarly situated
to married couples. 180 Instead, the court concluded that all homo-
sexuals, whether involved in long-term relationships or not, were sim-
ilarly situated to other unmarried individuals. The court stated,
The negotiated terms of the [Health Care Act] limit eligibility for
benefits of family members, thereby excluding all non-spouses or
other unmarried non-children, of both the opposite and same sex.
Homosexuals are simply a part of the larger class of unmarried
persons, to which also belong the employees' filial relations and
parents, for example. The terms have the same effect on the entire
class of unmarried persons. Rather than discriminating on the basis
of sexual orientation, therefore, the dental plans distinguish eli-
gibility on the basis of marriage.'8'
Since California law is settled that discrimination by a state
agency on the basis of marital status is permissible under the Cal-
ifornia equal protection clause if it is rationally related to a legitimate
state purpose, the Hinman court relied on the strong state policy
favoring marriage and found no equal protection violation.8 2
Having recognized that the administration of dental benefits did
discriminate on the basis of marital status, however, the court went
on to consider whether the plan violated the state statutory prohi-
bition against marital status discrimination. 83 Relying on a provision
in California's prohibition of marital status discrimination that ex-
cludes bona fide health plans from coverage, 184 the court found that
the state had adopted a bona fide dental plan and held that it was
not bound to offer equal benefits to married and unmarried em-
ployees.8 5
Although the gay plaintiff in Hinman did not prevail on his claim,
the court's decision suggests that in the absence of an express ex-
ception, health plans that provide additional benefits for spouses of
married employees but not for partners of unmarried employees would
be found to violate the prohibition against marital status discrimi-
nation.
The Hinman case also makes an important point regarding the
role of a lesbian or gay plaintiff in a marital status discrimination
case. The court concluded that, for purposes of analysis, a gay plain-
tiff with a long-term, committed partner will be treated exactly the
180. Id. at 526, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
181. Id. (emphasis added).
182. Id. at 527-28, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
183. See id.
184. Id. at 529, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
185. Id. at 530, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
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same as any other unmarried plaintiff-even though he would have
married his partner long ago had the laws of the state allowed him
to do So. 1 86 When bringing a challenge to marital status discrimi-
nation, therefore, the lesbian or gay plaintiff stands within the larger
class of unmarried individuals. 187
(2) The Lesbian or Gay Plaintiffs Challenge under the Refined
Inclusive Rule
The refined inclusive rule proposed in Part II of this Note pro-
vides a clear framework for evaluating a lesbian or gay plaintiff's
challenge in marital status discrimination cases. For instance, sup-
pose a lesbian plaintiff in a significant long-term relationship with
another woman applies for admission to a housing cooperative. Sup-
pose further, that the plaintiff is told she will not be admitted because
the cooperative only accepts married applicants. To make out a prima
facie case of marital status discrimination, the plaintiff would have
to prove that her marital status was a motivating factor in the chal-
lenged decision. The explicit reason given for the denial, perhaps
bolstered by a showing that the cooperative did, in fact, admit only
married couples, would suffice to meet the plaintiff's burden. The
defendant would then have the burden of proving that the same de-
cision would have been made even if marital status had not been
considered.
To meet this burden, the cooperative might argue that the same
decision would have been made based solely on the fact that the
plaintiff is a lesbian. Assuming the jurisdiction where the case is
brought does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation,
it is unlikely that the plaintiff could prevail. The defendant could
argue successfully that it had a legally inoffensive reason for dis-
criminatorily denying the application. In the growing number of ju-
risdictions that have prohibited discrimination against lesbians and
gay men, 88 however, such a defense would constitute illegal dis-
186. Alternatively, given the unique position lesbians and gays hold vis-d-vis the insti-
tution of marriage, the court could have reached a different conclusion. Instead of consid-
ering the plaintiff single and completely dismissing his twelve-year relationship, the court
could have adopted a test to determine when a homosexual relationship is significant enough
to qualify as a truly familial relationship. See, e.g., Butcher v. Superior Court, 139 Cal.
App. 3d 58, 70, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503, 512 (1983) overruled, Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d
246, 250 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1988); Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 221, 543 N.E.2d
49, 53-54, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784, 789 (1989).
187. Hinman v. Dep't of Personnel Admin., 167 Cal. App. 3d 516, 526, 213 Cal. Rptr.
410, 416 (1985).
188. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512 (1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, §
4 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.31 (West 1988).
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crimination based on sexual orientation and could not satisfy the
burden of proving a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the de-
nial.
Conversely, in a jurisdiction where it is illegal to discriminate
on the basis of sexual orientation but legal to do so on the basis of
marital status, the defendant in the same hypothetical might argue
that the plaintiff's application was denied not because she is a les-
bian, but because she is unmarried.
Standing alone, therefore, the prohibition of marital status dis-
crimination may not offer lesbians and gay men significant protec-
tion. When it is combined with a prohibition of sexual orientation
discrimination, however, the two antidiscrimination measures ought
to provide effective legal protection for lesbian and gay communities.
Conclusion
In the last twenty years, judicial application of state prohibitions
of marital status discrimination has been confused. Rather than being
defined and developed within the traditional framework of prohi-
bitions against discrimination based on race, sex, age, disability, and
national origin, marital status has been cut away from the very leg-
islation wherein it resides. Though courts have struggled to create
an independent doctrine of marital status discrimination, they have
been bogged down by concerns about the state's interest in marriage,
the political status of unmarried couples, and efforts to divine a leg-
islative intent more attuned to supporting a specific outcome in par-
ticular cases than to aiding in the elimination of arbitrary
classifications.
As our country's families grow and diversify, state prohibitions
of marital status discrimination could be an important tool for the
protection of nontraditional couples, both heterosexual and homo-
sexual. For this to happen, however, the courts must reconnect mar-
ital status provisions to their roots in established state
antidiscrimination law. This Note has proposed a straight-forward
method of analyzing marital status discrimination claims that has
been strongly affirmed in both state and federal courts. 8 9 The refined
inclusive rule test suggested here would promote the basic goal be-
hind all human rights legislation-that individuals be treated ac-
cording to their abilities and potential, not according to offensive and
demeaning stereotypes. Judicial application of this rule would show
189. See supra Part I.B.
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that the law does, indeed, reflect the realities of our society and that
the courts will no longer allow private enterprises arbitrarily to de-
termine which loving relationships will be noticed and which will not.
